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Abstract
How can multiple distributed entities collaboratively train a shared deep net on their private
data while preserving privacy? This paper introduces InstaHide, a simple encryption of training
images, which can be plugged into existing distributed deep learning pipelines. The encryption
is efficient and applying it during training has minor effect on test accuracy.
InstaHide encrypts each training image with a “one-time secret key” which consists of mixing
a number of randomly chosen images and applying a random pixel-wise mask. Other contri-
butions of this paper include: (a) Using a large public dataset (e.g. ImageNet) for mixing
during its encryption, which improves security. (b) Experimental results to show effective-
ness in preserving privacy against known attacks with only minor effects on accuracy. (c)
Theoretical analysis showing that successfully attacking privacy requires attackers to solve a
difficult computational problem. (d) Demonstrating that use of the pixel-wise mask is im-
portant for security, since Mixup alone is shown to be insecure to some some efficient at-
tacks. (e) Release of a challenge dataset1 to encourage new attacks. Our code is available
at https://github.com/Hazelsuko07/InstaHide.
∗A preliminary version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of the 37th International Conference on Machine
Learning (ICML 2020).
†yangsibo@princeton.edu. Princeton University.
‡zhaos@princeton.edu. Princeton University and Institute for Advanced Study.
§li@cs.princeton.edu. Princeton University.
¶arora@cs.princeton.edu. Princeton University and Institute for Advanced Study.
1https://github.com/Hazelsuko07/InstaHide Challenge.
ar
X
iv
:2
01
0.
02
77
2v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  6
 O
ct 
20
20
1 Introduction
In many applications, multiple parties or clients with sensitive data want to collaboratively train a
neural network. For instance, hospitals may wish to train a model on their patient data. However,
aggregating data to a central server may violate regulations such as Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) [Act96] and General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [VVdB18].
Federated learning [MMR+17, KMY+16] proposes letting participants train on their own data in
a distributed fashion and share only model updates —i.e., gradients—with the central server. The
server aggregates these updates (typically by averaging) to improve a global model and then sends
updates to participants. This process runs iteratively until the global model converges. Merging
information from individual data points into aggregated gradients intuitively preserves privacy to
some degree. On top of that, it is possible to add noise to gradients in accordance with Differential
Privacy (DP) [DKM+06, DR14], though careful calculations are needed to compute the amount
of noise to be added [ACG+16, PCS+19]. However, the privacy guarantee of DP only applies to
the trained model (i.e., approved use of data) and does not apply to side-channel computations
performed by curious/malicious parties who are privy to the communicated gradients. Recent
work [ZLH19] suggests that eavesdropping attackers can recover private inputs from shared model
updates, even when DP was used. A more serious issue with DP is that meaningful guarantees
involve adding so much noise that test accuracy reduces by over 20% even on CIFAR-10 [PCS+19].
Cryptographic methods such as secure multiparty computation of [Yao82] and fully-homomorphic
encryption [Gen09] can ensure privacy against arbitrary side-computations by adversary during
training. Unfortunately it is a challenge to use them in modern deep learning settings, owing to
their high computational overheads and their needs for special setups (e.g finite field arithmetic,
public-key infrastructure).
Here we introduce a new method InstaHide, inspired by a weaker cryptographic idea of instance
hiding schemes [AFK87]. We only apply it to image data in this paper and leave other data types
(e.g., text) for future work. InstaHide gives a way to transform input x to a hidden/encrypted input
x˜ in each epoch such that: (a) Training deep nets using the x˜’s instead of x’s gives nets almost as
good in terms of final accuracy; (b) Known methods for recovering information about x out of x˜
are computationally very expensive. In other words, x˜ effectively hides information contained in x
except for its label.
InstaHide encryption has two key components. The first is inspired by Mixup data augmentation
method [ZCDLP18], which trains deep nets on composite images created via linear combination of
pairs of images (viewed as vectors of pixel values). In InstaHide the first step when encrypting image
x (see Figure 1) is to take its linear combination with k−1 randomly chosen images from either the
participant’s private training set or from a large public dataset (e.g., ImageNet [DDS+09]). The
second step of InstaHide involves applying a random pattern of sign flips on the pixel values of
this composite image, yielding encrypted image x˜, which can be used as-is in existing deep learning
frameworks. Note that the set of random images for mixing and the random sign flipped mask are
used only once —in other words, as a one-time key that is never re-used for another encryption.
The idea of random sign flipping2 is inspired by classic Instance-Hiding over finite field GF(2),
which involves adding a random vector r to an input x. (See Appendix A for background.) Adding
2Note that randomly flipping signs of coordinates in vector x can be viewed alternatively as retaining only absolute
value of each pixel in the mixed image. If a pixel value was c in the original image, the mixup portion of our encryption
amounts to scaling it by λ and adding some value η to it from the mixing images, and the random sign flip amounts
to retaining |λc+ η|. Figure 6 gives an illustration.
We choose to take the viewpoint of random sign flips because this is more useful in extensions of InstaHide, which
are forthcoming.
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Figure 1: Applying InstaHide (k = 4) to the leftmost private image consists of mixing with another
(private) image randomly chosen from the training set and two images randomly chosen from a
fixed large public dataset. This is followed by a random sign-flipping mask on the composite image.
To encrypt another image, different random choices will get used (“one-time key”).
1 over GF(2) is analogous to a sign flip over R. (Specifically, the groups (GF(2),+) and ({±1},×)
are isomorphic.) The use of a public dataset in InstaHide plays a role reminiscent of random oracle
in cryptographic schemes [CGH04] —the larger this dataset, the better the conjectured security
level (see Section 4). A large private dataset would suffice too for security, but then would require
prior coordination/sharing among participants.
Experiments on MNIST, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and ImageNet datasets (see Section 5) suggest
that InstaHide is an effective approach to hide training images from attackers. It is much more
effective at hiding images than Mixup alone and provides better trade-off between privacy preser-
vation and accuracy than DP. To enable further rigorous study of attacks, we release a challenge
dataset of images encrypted using InstaHide.
Enhanced functionality due to InstaHide. As hinted above, InstaHide plugs seamlessly into
existing distributed learning frameworks such as federated learning: clients encrypt their inputs
on the fly with InstaHide and participate in training (without using DP). Depending upon the
level of security needed in the application (see Section 4.1), InstaHide can also be used to present
enhanced functionality that are unsafe in current distributed frameworks. For instance, in each
epoch, computationally limited clients can encrypt each private input x to x˜ and ship it to the
central server for all subsequent computation. The server may randomize in the pooled data
to create its own batches to deal with special learning situations when distributed data are not
independent and identically distributed.
Rest of the Paper: Section 2 recaps Mixup and suggests it alone is not secure. Section 3
presents two InstaHide schemes, and Section 4 analyzes their security. Section 5 shows experiments
for InstaHide’s efficiency, efficacy, and security. Section 6 provides suggestions for practical use, and
Section 7 describes the challenge dataset. We review related work in Section 8, discuss potential
attacks in Section 9 and conclude in Section 10.
2 Mixup and Its Vulnerability
This section reviews Mixup method [ZCDLP18] for data augmentation in deep learning and shows
—using two plausible attacks— that it alone does not assure privacy. For ease of description, we
consider a vision task with a private dataset X ⊂ Rd of size n. Each image xi ∈ X , i ∈ [n] is
2
Algorithm 1 Mixup [ZCDLP18]
1: procedure Mixup(W,T,X ,Y)
2: W : the weights of the deep neural network; T : number of epochs; X = {x1, · · · , xn},Y =
{y1, · · · , yn}: the original dataset.
3: Initialize W
4: for t = 1→ T do
5: Generate pi1 such that pi1(i) = i, ∀i ∈ [n], and k − 1 random permutations pi2, · · · , pik : [n]→ [n]
. [n] denotes {1, 2, · · · , n}
6: Sample λ1, · · · , λn ∼ [0, 1]k uniformly at random, and for all i ∈ [n] normalize λi such that
‖λi‖1 = 1.
7: D˜ ← ∅
8: for i = 1→ n do . Generate Mixup dataset
9: x˜mixi ←
∑k
j=1(λi)j · xpij(i) . Mix images
10: y˜i ←
∑k
j=1(λi)j · ypij(i) . Mix labels
11: D˜ ← D˜ ∪ (x˜i, y˜i)
12: end for
13: Train W using the Mixup dataset D˜
14: end for
15: end procedure
normalized such that
∑d
j=1 xi,j = 0 and ‖xi‖2 = 1.
See Algorithm 1. Given an original dataset, in each epoch of the training the algorithm generates
a Mixup dataset on the fly, by linearly combining k random samples, as well as their labels (lines 9,
10). Mixup suggests that training with mixed samples and mixed labels serves the purpose of data
augmentation, and achieves better test accuracy on normal images.
We describe the algorithm as an operation on k images, but previous works mostly used k = 2.
2.1 Attack on Mixup within a Private Dataset
We propose an attack to the Mixup method when a private image is mixed up more than once
during training. In fact, in Algorithm 1, each image is used kT times during training, where k is
the number of samples to mix, and T is the number of training epochs.
Assume that pairs of images in X are fairly independent at the pixel level, so that the inner
product of a random pair of images (viewed as vectors) has expectation 0 (expectation can be
nonzero but small). We can think of each pixel is generated from some distribution with standard
deviation 1/
√
d and describe attacks with this assumption. (Section 5 presents experiments showing
that these attacks do work in practice.)
Suppose we have two Mixup images x˜1 and x˜2 which are derived from two subsets of private
images, S1,S2 ⊂ X and |S1| = |S2| = k. If x˜1 and x˜2 contain different private images, namely
S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, then the expectation of x˜1 · x˜2 is 0. However, if S1 ∩ S2 6= ∅, and x˜1 and x˜2 have
coefficients λ1 and λ2 for the common image in these two sets, then the expectation of 〈x˜1, x˜2〉
is λ1λ2/k, which means by simply checking the inner products between two x˜’s, the attacker can
determine with high probability whether they are derived from the same image. Thus if the attacker
finds multiple such pairs, they can average the x˜’s to start getting a good estimate of x. (Note that
the rest of images in the pairs are with high probability distinct and so average to 0.)
3
Setting Secure?
x is mixed in multiple x˜’s No
x is mixed in a single x˜, with a public dataset No
x is mixed in a single x˜, with a private dataset Maybe
Table 1: Security of Mixup alone.
2.2 Attack on Mixup Between a Private and a Public Dataset
To defend against the previous attack, it seems that a possible method is to modify the Mixup
method to mix a private image x with k − 1 images only once to get a single x˜, and use this x˜
as surrogate for x in all epochs. To ensure x ∈ X is used only once, it uses an additional public
dataset X ′ (e.g. ImageNet). In other words, for every x ∈ X , it produces x˜ by using Mixup between
x and k − 1 random images from a large public dataset.
This extension of the Mixup method seems secure at first glance, as naively one can imagine that
to violate privacy, the adversary must do exhaustive search over (k − 1)-tuples of public images to
determine which were mixed into x˜, and try all possible k-tuples of coefficients, and then subtract
the corresponding sum from x˜ to extract x. If this is true, it would suggest that extracting x or any
approximation to it requires
(
N
k−1
) ≈ Nk−1 work, where N is the number of images in the public
dataset. This work becomes infeasible even for k = 4. However, we sketch an attack below that
runs in O(Nk) time.
It again uses the above assumption about the pairwise independence property of a random
image pair. Recall that standard deviation of pixels is 1/
√
d. Namely, to determine the images
that went into the mixed sample x˜ = λ1x1 +
∑k
i=2 λixi, it suffices to go through each image z in
the dataset and examine the inner product z · x˜. If z is not one of the xi’s then this inner product
is of the order at most
√
k/d (see part 1 of Theorem B.3), whereas if it is one of the xi’s then it
is of the order at least 1k (1−
√
k/d) (see part 2 of Theorem B.3). Thus if k3  d (which is true if
the number of pixels d is a few thousand) then the inner product gives a strong signal whether z is
one of the xi’s. Once the correct xi’s and their coefficients have been guessed, we obtain x up to a
linear scaling. Thus the above attack works with good probability and in time proportional to the
size of the dataset. We provide results for this attack in Section 5.
This attack of course requires that x is being mixed in with images from a public dataset X ′.
In the case that X ′ is private and diverse enough, it is conceivable that Mixup is safe. (MNIST for
example may not be diverse enough but ImageNet probably is.) We leave it as an open question.
2.3 Discussions
Table 1 summarizes the security of Mixup . Only Mixup with single x˜ for each private x and
within a private dataset(s) has not been identified vulnerable to potential attacks. But this does
not necessarily mean it is secure. In addition, the test accuracy in this case is not comparable to
vanilla training; it incurs about 20% accuracy loss with CIFAR-10 tasks.
Potentially insecure applications of Mixup. Recently, a method called FaceMix [LWZ+19]
applies Mixup at the representation level (i.e. intermediate output of deep models) during inference.
Given a representation function h : Rd → Rl and a secret x ∈ Rd, the paper assumed a threat model
that the attacker is able to reconstruct x given h(x). Therefore, FaceMix proposed to protect the
privacy of x by generating h˜1(x) = λ1h(x) +
∑k
i=2 λih(xi), and run inference on h˜(x). A similar
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Algorithm 2 Inside-dataset InstaHide
1: procedure InstaHide(W,T,X ,Y) . This paper
2: W : weights of the neural network; T : number of epochs;
X = {x1, · · · , xn}: data; Y = {y1, · · · , yn}: labels.
3: Initialize W
4: for t = 1→ T do
5: Generate pi1 such that pi1(i) = i, ∀i ∈ [n], and k − 1 random permutations pi2, · · · , pik : [n]→ [n]
6: Sample λ1, · · · , λn ∼ [0, 1]k uniformly at random, and for all i ∈ [n] normalize λi ∈ Rk such that
‖λi‖1 = 1 and ‖λi‖∞ ≤ c1. . c1 ∈ [0, 1] is a constant that upper bounds a single coefficient
7: Sample σ1, · · · , σn ∼ Λd± uniformly at random. . Definition 3.1
8: D˜ ← ∅
9: for i = 1→ n do . Generate InstaHide dataset
10: x˜i ← σi ◦
∑k
j=1(λi)j · xpij(i) . Encryption
11: y˜i ←
∑k
j=1(λi)j · ypij(i) . Mix labels
12: D˜ ← D˜ ∪ (x˜i, y˜i)
13: end for
14: Train W using the InstaHide dataset D˜
15: end for
16: end procedure
but different idea was shown in [FWX+19], which proposed to generate x˜ = λ1x +
∑k
i=2 λixi and
use h˜2(x) = h(x˜) for training.
Both methods may be vulnerable to the attacks presented in this section: when h is linear (one
example in [LWZ+19]), we have h˜1(x) = h˜2(x), which means the attacker can reconstruct the Mixup
image x˜ = λ1x+
∑k
i=1 xi from h˜1(x) and run attacks on Mixup. For a nonlinear h, h˜1(x) ≈ h˜2(x)
may also hold.
3 InstaHide
This section first presents two schemes: Inside-dataset InstaHide and Cross-dataset InstaHide, and
then describes their inference.
The Inside-dataset InstaHide mixes each training image with random images within the same
private training dataset. The cross-dataset InstaHide, arguably more secure (see Section 4), involves
mixing with random images from a large public dataset like ImageNet.
3.1 Inside-Dataset InstaHide
Algorithm 2 shows Inside-dataset InstaHide. Its encryption step includes mixing the secret image
x with k − 1 other training images followed by an extra random pixel-wise sign-flipping mask on
the composite image. Note that random sign flipping changes the color of a pixel. The motivation
for random sign flips was described around Footnote 2.
Definition 3.1 (random mask distribution Λd±). Let Λd± denote the d-dimensional random sign
distribution such that ∀σ ∼ Λd±, for i ∈ [d], σi is independently chosen from {±1} with probability
1/2 each.
To encrypt a private input xi, we first determine the random coefficient λ’s for image-wise
combination, but with the constraint that they are at most c1 to avoid dominant leakage of any
single image (line 6 in Algorithm 2). Then we sample a random mask σi ∼ Λd± and apply σ ◦ x,
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where ◦ is coordinate-wise multiplication of vectors (line 10 in Algorithm 2). Note that the random
mask σi and the k − 1 images used for mixing with xi, will not be reused to encrypt other images.
They constitute a “random one-time private key.”
A priori. It may seem that using a different mask for each training sample would completely
destroy the accuracy of the trained net, but as we will see later it has only a small effect when k is
small. Mathematically, this seems reminiscent of the phase retrieval problem [CSV13, LN18] (see
Appendix D).
3.2 Cross-Dataset InstaHide
Cross-dataset InstaHide extends the encryption step of Algorithm 2 by mixing k images from the
private training dataset Dprivate and a public dataset Dpublic, and a random mask as a random
one-time secret key.
Although the second dataset can be private, there are several motivations to use a public
dataset: (a) Some privacy-sensitive datasets, (e.g. CT or MRI scans), feature images with certain
structure patterns with uniform backgrounds. Mixing among such images as in Algorithm 2 would
not hide information effectively. (b) Drawing mixing images from a larger dataset gives greater
unpredictability, hence better security (see Section 4). (c) Public datasets are freely available and
eliminate the need for special setups among participants in a distributed learning setting.
To mix k images in the encryption step, we randomly choose 2 images from Dprivate and the
other k− 2 from Dpublic, and apply InstaHide to all these images. The only difference in the cross-
dataset scheme is that, the model is trained to learn only the (mixed) label of Dprivate images. We
assume Dpublic images are unlabelled. For better accuracy, we lower bound the sum of coefficients
of two private images by a constant c2 ∈ [0, 1].
We advocate preprocessing a public dataset in two steps to obtain Dpublic for better security.
The first is to randomly crop a number of patches from each image in the public dataset to form
Dpublic. This step will make Dpublic much larger than the original public dataset. The second is
to filter out the “flat” patches. In our implementation, we design a filter using SIFT [Low99], a
feature extraction technique to retain patches with more than 40 key points.
3.3 Inference with InstaHide
Either scheme above by default applies InstaHide during inference, by averaging predictions of mul-
tiple encryptions (e.g. 10) of a test sample. This idea is akin to existing cryptographic frameworks
for secure evaluation on a public server via homomorphic encryption (e.g. [MLS+20]). Since the
encryption step of InstaHide is very efficient, the overhead of such inference is quite small.
One can also choose not to apply InstaHide during inference. We found in our experiments
(Section 5) that it works for low-resolution image datasets such as CIFAR-10 but it does not work
well with a high-resolution image dataset such as ImageNet.
4 Security Analysis
This section considers the security of InstaHide in distributed learning, specifically the cross-dataset
version.
Attack scenario: In each epoch, all clients replace each (image, label)-pair (x, y) in the training
set with some (x˜, y˜) using InstaHide. Attackers observe h(x˜, y˜) for some function h: in federated
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Figure 2: Empirical distributions of 3 statistics (first row) and 4 random locations (second row) for
400 InstaHide encryptions of 10 different images (cross-dataset, k = 4). Distributions of encryptions
of different images are indistinguishable.
learning h could involve batch gradients or hidden-layer activations computed using input x˜, y˜ as
well as other inputs.
Argument for security consists of two halves: (1) To recover significant information about an
image x from communicated information, computationally limited eavesdroppers/attackers have to
break InstaHide encryption (Section 4.1). (2) Breaking InstaHide is difficult (Section 4.2).
4.1 Secure Encryption Implies Secure Protocol
Suppose an attacker exists that compromises an image x in the protocol. We do the thought
experiment of even providing the attacker with encryptions of all images belonging to all parties, as
well as model parameters in each iteration. Now everything the attacker sees during the protocol
it can efficiently compute by itself, and we can convert the attacker to one that, given x˜, extracts
information about x. We conclude in this thought experiment that a successful attack on the
protocol also yields a successful attack on the encryption. In other words, privacy loss during
protocol is upper bounded by privacy loss due to the encryption itself. Of course, this proof allows
the possibility that the protocol —due to aggregation of gradients, etc.—ensures even greater
privacy than the encryption alone.
Dealing with multiple encryptions of same x: In our protocol each image x is re-encrypted in
each epoch. This seems to act as a data augmentation and improves accuracy. The above argument
translated to this setting shows that privacy violation requires solving the following problem: private
images x1, x2, . . . , xn were each encrypted T times (n is size of the private training set, T is number
of epochs), each time using a new private key. Attacker is given these nT encryptions. Weaker
task: Attacker has to identify which of them came from x1. Stronger task: Attacker has to identify
x1.
We conjecture both tasks are hard. Visualization (see Figure 2) as well as the Kolmogorov–Smirnov
test [Kol33, Smi48] (see Appendix E) suggest that statistically, it is difficult to distinguish among
distributions of encryptions of different images. Thus, effectively identifying multiple x˜’s of same
x and using them to run attacks seems difficult.
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4.2 Hardness of Attacking InstaHide Encryption
Now we consider the difficulty of recovering information about x given a single encryption x˜.
Security estimates of naive attack. We start by considering the naive attack on cross-dataset
InstaHide, which would involve the attacker to either figure out the set of all k−2 public images, or
to compromise the mask σ and run attacks on Mixup. This should take min{|Dpublic|k−2, 2d} time.
For cross-dataset InstaHide schemes with a large public dataset (e.g. ImageNet), the computation
cost of attack will be 107(k−2), and k = 4 already makes the attack hard.
Now we suggest reasons why the naive attack may be best possible.
For worst-case pixel-vectors, finding the k-image set is hard. Appendix C shows that for
worst-case choices of images (i.e., when an “image” is allowed to be an arbitrary sequence of pixel
values) the computational complexity of this problem is related to the famous k-vector subset
sum problem.3 The attacker would need to exhaustively search over all possible combinations of
public images, which is at the cost of |Dpublic|k−2. Thus when Dpublic is a large public dataset and
k ≥ 4, the computational effort to recover the image ought to be of the order of 1010 or more.
Of course, images are not worst-case vectors. Thus an attack must leverage this fact somehow.
The obvious idea today is to use a deep net for the attack, and the experiments below will suggest
the obvious ideas do not work.
Compromising the mask is also hard. As previously discussed, the pixel-wise mask σ ∼ Λd± (
Def. 3.1) in InstaHide is kept private by each client, which is analogous to a private key (assuming
the client never shares its own σ with others, and the generation of σ is statistically random).
Brute-force algorithm consumes 2d time to figure out σ, where d can be several thousands in vision
tasks.
5 Experiments
We have conducted experiments to answer three questions:
1. How much accuracy loss does InstaHide suffer (Section 5.1)?
2. How is the accuracy loss of InstaHide compared to differential privacy approaches (Sec-
tion 5.2)?
3. Can InstaHide defend against known attacks (Section 5.3)?
We are particularly interested in the cases where k ≥ 4.
Datasets and setup. Our main experiments are image classification tasks on four datasets
MNIST [LCB10], CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 [Kri09], and ImageNet [DDS+09]. We use ResNet-
18 [HZRS16] architecture for MNIST and CIFAR-10, NasNet [ZVSL18] for CIFAR-100, and ResNeXt-
50 [XGD+17] for ImageNet. The implementation uses the Pytorch [PGM+19] framework. Note
that we convert greyscale MNIST images to be 3-channel RGB images in our experiments. Hyper-
parameters are provided in Appendix E.
3Given a set of N public vectors v1, · · · vN ∈ Rd and ∑kj vij , the sum of a secret subset i1, · · · , ik of size k,
k-vector subset sum aims to find i1, · · · , ik. However, in our case (cross-dataset InstaHide), only k− 2 vectors are
drawn from the public set while the other 2 are drawn from a private set. All the vectors are public in the classical
setting, therefore our setting is even harder.
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Figure 3: Test accuracy (%) on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 for vanilla training and inside-
dataset InstaHide with different k’s. InstaHide with k ≤ 4 only suffers small accuracy loss.
MNIST CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100 ImageNet Assumptions
Vanilla training 99.5± 0.1 94.8± 0.1 77.9± 0.2 77.4 -
DPSGD∗ 98.1 72.0 N/A N/A A1
InstaHideinside,k=4, in inference 98.2± 0.2 91.4± 0.2 73.2± 0.2 72.6 -
InstaHideinside,k=4 98.2± 0.3 91.2± 0.2 73.1± 0.3 1.4 -
InstaHidecross,k=4, in inference 98.1± 0.2 90.3± 0.2 72.8± 0.3 - A2
InstaHidecross,k=4 97.8± 0.2 90.7± 0.2 73.2± 0.2 - A2
InstaHidecross,k=6, in inference 97.4± 0.2 89.6± 0.3 72.1± 0.2 - A2
InstaHidecross,k=6 97.3± 0.1 89.8± 0.3 71.9± 0.3 - A2
Table 2: Test accuracy (%) on MNIST, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and ImageNet for vanilla training,
DPSGD [ACG+16] and InstaHide, including the mean and standard deviation of test accuracy
across 5 runs except for ImageNet. Results marked with “in inference” applies InstaHide during
inference. InstaHide methods incur minor accuracy reductions. A1 denotes “Using a labelled
public dataset for pre-training”, A2 denotes “ Using a large unlabelled public dataset for hiding”.
∗DPSGD results are from [PCS+19], which does not have results for CIFAR-100 and ImageNet.
5.1 Accuracy Results of InstaHide
We evaluate the following InstaHide variants (with c1 = 0.65, c2 = 0.3):
• Inside-dataset InstaHide with different k’s, where k is chosen from {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}.
• Cross-dataset InstaHide with k = 4, 6. For MNIST, we use CIFAR-10 as the public dataset;
for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, we use the preprocessed ImageNet as the public dataset. We
do not test Cross-dataset InstaHide on ImageNet since its sample size is already large enough
for good security.
The computation overhead of InstaHide in terms of extra training time in our experiments is
smaller than 5%.
Accuracy with different k’s. Figure 3 shows the test accuracy of vanilla training, and inside-
dataset InstaHide with different k’s on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 benchmarks. Compared
with vanilla training, InstaHide with k = 4 only suffers small accuracy loss of 1.3%, 3.4%, and 4.7%
respectively. Also, increasing k from 1 (i.e., apply mask on original images, no Mixup) to 2 (i.e.,
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Figure 4: Relative accuracy on CIFAR-10 (a) and visualization (b) of InstaHide and adding random
Laplace noise with different α’s, the coefficient of perturbation. InstaHide gives better test accuracy
than adding random noise.
apply mask on pairwise mixed images) improves the test accuracy for CIFAR datasets, suggesting
that Mixup data augmentation also helps for encrypted InstaHide data points.
Inside-dataset v.s. Cross-dataset. We also evaluate the performance of Cross-dataset In-
staHide, which does encryption using random images from both the private dataset and a large
public dataset. As shown in Table 2, Cross-dataset InstaHide incurs an additional small accuracy
loss comparing with inside-dataset InstaHide. The total accuracy losses for MNIST, CIFAR-10 and
CIFAR-100 are 1.7%, 4.1%, and 4.7% respectively. As previously suggested, a large public dataset
provides a stronger notion of security.
Inference with and without InstaHide. As mentioned in Sec 3.3, by default, InstaHide is
applied during inference. In our experiments, we average predictions of 10 encryptions of a test
image. We found that for high-resolution images, applying InstaHide during inference is important:
the results of using Inside-dataset InstaHide on ImageNet in Table 2 show that the accuracy of
inference with InstaHide is 72.6%, whereas that without InstaHide is only 1.4%.
5.2 InstaHide vs. Differential Privacy approaches
Although InstaHide is qualitatively different from differential privacy in terms of privacy guarantee,
we would like to provide hints for their relative accuracy (Question 2).
Comparison with DPSGD. DPSGD [ACG+16] injects noise to gradients to control private
leakage. Table 2 shows that DPSGD leads to an accuracy drop of about 20% on CIFAR-10 dataset.
By contrast, InstaHide gives models almost as good as vanilla training in terms of test accuracy.
Comparison with adding random noise to images. We also compare InstaHide (i.e., adding
structured noise) with adding random noise to images (another typical approach to preserve differ-
ential privacy). Specifically, given the original dataset X , and a perturbation coefficient α ∈ (0, 1),
we test a) InstaHideinside,k=2: x˜i = σ ◦ ((1 − α)xi + αxj), where xj ∈ X , j 6= i, and b) adding
random Laplace noise e: x˜i = (1− α)xi + e, where E[‖e‖1] = E[‖αxj‖1].
As shown in Figure 4, by increasing α from 0.1 to 0.9, the test accuracy of adding random noise
drops from ∼ 94% to ∼ 10%, while the accuracy of InstaHide is above 90%.
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Figure 5: Visualization of (a) the original image, (b) Mixup and InstaHide images, and (c) images
recovered by the gradients matching attack. InstaHide is more effective in hiding the image than
Mixup.
5.3 Robustness Against Attacks
To answer the question how well InstaHide can defend known attacks, here we report our find-
ings with a sequence of attacks on InstaHide encryption x˜ to recover original image x, including
gradient-matching attack [ZLH19], demasking using GAN (Generative Adversarial Network), av-
eraging multiple encryptions, and uncovering public images with similarity search.
Gradient-matching attack [ZLH19]. Here attacker observes gradients of the loss generated
using a user’s private image s while training a deep net (attacker knows the deep net, e.g., as
a participant in Federated Learning) and tries to recover s by computing an image s∗ that has
similar gradients to those of s (see algorithm in Appendix E). Figure 5 shows results of this attack
on Mixup and InstaHide schemes on CIFAR-10. If Mixup with k = 4 is used, the attacker can still
extract fair bit of information about the original image. However, if InstaHide is used the attack
isn’t successful.
Demask using GAN. InstaHide does pixel-wise random sign-flip after applying Mixup (with
public images, in the most secure version). This flips the signs of half the pixels in the mixed
image. An alternative way to think about it is that the adversary sees the intensity information
(i.e. absolute value) but not the sign of the pixel. Attackers could use computer vision ideas to
recover the sign. One attack consists of training a GAN on this sign-recovery task4, using a large
training set of (z, σ ◦ z) where z is a mixed image and σ is a random mask. If this GAN recovers
the signs reliably, this effectively removes the mask, after which one could use the attacks against
Mixup described in Section 2.
In experiments this only succeeded in recovering half the flipped signs, which means ∼ 1/4
of the coordinates continued to have the wrong sign; see Figure 6. GAN training5 used 50,000
cross-dataset InstaHide examples generated with CIFAR-10 and ImageNet (k = 6). This level of
sign recovery seems insufficient to allow the attack against Mixup (Section 2) to succeed, nor the
other attacks discussed below. Nevertheless, researchers trying to break InstaHide may want to use
such a demasking GAN as a starting point.
4We thank Florian Trame`r for suggesting this attack.
5We use this GAN architecture (designed for image colorization): https://github.com/zeruniverse/neural-
colorization.
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Figure 6: Undo sign-flipping using GAN. Rows: (1) Output from Mixup algorithm (Algorithm 1,
line 9); (2) Result of applying random mask σ on previous row (Algorithm 2, line 10). Note
that randomly flipping sign of a pixel still preserves its absolute value. (3) Taking coordinate-wise
absolute value of previous row. (4) Output of demasking GAN on previous row. The attack corrects
about 1/4 of the flipped signs but this doesn’t appear enough to allow further attacks that recover
the encrypted image.
Average multiple encryptions of the same image. We further test if different encryptions of
the same image (after demasking) can be used to recover that hidden image by running the attack
in Section 2.1.
Assuming a public history of n× T encryptions, where n is the size of the private training set,
and T is the number of epochs. We consider a stronger and a weaker version of this attack.
• Stronger attack: the attacker already knows the set of multiple encryptions of the same
image x. He uses GAN to demask all encryptions in the set, and averages images in the
demasked set to estimate x.
• Weaker attack: the attacker does not know which subset of the encryption history cor-
respond to the same original image. To identify that subset, he firstly demasks all n × T
encrytions in the history using GAN. With an arbitrary demasked encryption (from the his-
tory) for some unknown original image x, he runs similarity search to find top-m closest
images in n × T − 1 other demasked encryptions (which may also contain x), and averages
these m+ 1 images to estimate x.
The stronger attack is conceivable if n is very small (say a hospital only has 100 images), so via
brute force the attacker can effectively have a small set of encryptions of the same image. However,
in practice, n is usually at least a few thousand.
For simplicity, we test with n = 50 and T = 50 (a larger n will make the attack harder). We
use the structural similarity index measure (SSIM) [WBSS04] as the similarity metric, and set m
to 5 after tuning.
We also run this attack directly on Mixup for comparison. As shown in Figure 7, if the original
image is not flat (e.g. the “deer”), the stronger attack may not work. For flat images (e.g. the
“truck”) or images with strong contrast (e.g. the “automobile” and the “frog”), the stronger attack
is able to vaguely recover the original image. However, as previously suggested, the stronger attack
is feasible only for a very small n.
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Figure 7: Average multiple encryptions (after demasking) of the same image to attack (k = 6).
In the stronger attack, the attacker already knows the set of multiple encryptions of the same
image; in the weaker attack, the attacker has to identify that set first. Rows: (1) Original images.
(2-3) Results of the stronger and the weaker attacks on Mixup. (4-5) Results of the stronger and
the weaker attacks on InstaHide. Note that the attacker has to demask InstaHide encryptions
using GAN before running attacks, and the information loss of this step makes it harder to attack
InstaHide than the plain Mixup.
Note that results here is an upper bound on privacy leakage since we assume a perfect recovery
of x˜ from the gradients. In real-life scenarios this may not hold.
Uncover public images by similarity search. We also run the attack in Section 2.2 after
demasking InstaHide encryptions using GAN, which tries to uncover the public images for mixing
by running similarity search in the public dataset using the demasked encryption as the query.
We test with k = 6: mix 2 private images from CIFAR-10 with 4 public images from a set of
10,000 ImageNet images (i.e. N = 10, 000). We consider the attack a ‘hit’ if at least one public
image for mixing is among the top-m answers of the similarity search. The attacker uses SSIM as
the default similarity metric for search. However, a traditional alignment-based similarity metric
(e.g SSIM) would fail in InstaHide schemes which use randomly cropped patches of public images
for mixing (see Figure 8), so in that case, the attacker trains a deep model (VGG [SZ15] in our
experiments) to predict the similarity score.
Note that to find the 4 correct public images for mixing, the attack has to try all
(
m
4
)
combina-
tions of the top-m answers with different coefficients, and subtract the combined image from the
demasked InstaHide encryption to verify. Figure 8 reports the averaged hit rate of this attack on
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Figure 8: Averaged hit rate of uncovering public images for mixing among the top-m answers
returned by similarity search. Running this attack on InstaHide requires GAN-demasking as the
first step, and a wrongly demasked pixel will make the similarity score less reliable and yield lower
hit rate. Mixing with random cropped patches of public images augments the public dataset and
gives more security. It also disables similarity search using SSIM. Train a deep model to predict
similarity score also does not give a promising hit rate.
50 different InstaHide images. As shown, even with a relatively small public dataset (N = 10, 000)
and a large m =
√
N , the hit rate of this attack on InstaHide (enhanced with random cropping) is
around 0.05 (i.e. the attacker still has to try
(
m
4
)
= O(N2) combinations to succeed with probability
0.05). Also, this attack appears to become much more expensive with the public dataset being the
whole ImageNet dataset (N = 1.4× 107) or random images on the Internet.
6 InstaHide Deployment: Best practice
Based on our security analysis (sec 4 and sec 5.3), we suggest the following:
• Consider Inside-dataset InstaHide only if the private dataset is very large and images have
varied, complex patterns. If the images in the private dataset have simple signal patterns or
the dataset size is relatively small, consider using Cross-dataset InstaHide.
• For Cross-dataset InstaHide, use a very large public dataset. Follow the preprocessing steps
advocated in Sec 3.2 to randomly crop patches from each image in the public dataset and
filter out “flat” patches.
• Re-encrypt images in each epoch. This allows the benefits of greater data augmentation for
deep learning and hinders attacks (as suggested in Sec 5.3).
• Since images are re-encrypted in each epoch, for best security (e.g, against gradient-matching
attacks), each participant should perform a random re-batching so that batch gradients do
not correspond to the same subset of underlying images.
• Choose k = 4, 5, 6 for a good trade-off between accuracy and security.
• Set a conservative upper threshold for the coefficients in mixing (e.g. 0.65 in our experiments).
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7 A Challenge Dataset
To encourage readers to design stronger attacks, we release a challenge dataset6 of encrypted images
generated by applying Cross-dataset InstaHide with k = 6 on some private image dataset and a
preprocessed ImageNet as the public dataset. An attack is considered to succeed if it substantially
recovers a significant fraction of original images.
8 Related Work
Mixup. See Section 2. Mixup can improve both generalization and adversarial robustness [VLB+19].
It has also been adapted to various learning tasks, including semi-supervised data augmenta-
tion [BCG+19], unsupervised image synthesis [BHV+19], and adversarial defense at the inference
stage [PXZ19]. Recently, [FWX+19] combined Mixup with model aggregation to defend against in-
version attack, and [LWZ+19] proposed a novel method using Mixup for on-cloud privacy-preserving
inference.
Differential privacy. Differential privacy for deep learning involves controlling privacy leakage
by adding noise to the learning pipeline. If the noise is drawn from certain distributions, say
Gaussian or Laplace, it is possible to provide guarantees of privacy [DKM+06, DR14]. Applying
differential privacy techniques to distributed deep learning is non-trivial. Shokri and Shmatikov
[SS15] proposed a distributed learning scheme by directly adding noise to the shared gradients.
However, the amount of privacy guaranteed drops with the number of training epochs and the
size of shared parameters. DPSGD [ACG+16] was proposed to dynamically keep track of privacy
spending based on the composition theorem [Dwo09]. However, it still leads to an accuracy drop
of about 20% on CIFAR-10 dataset. Also, to control privacy leakage, DPSGD has to start with a
model pre-trained using nonprivate labeled data, and then carefully fine-tunes a few layers using
private data.
Privacy using cryptographic protocols. In distributed learning setting with multiple data
participants, it is possible for the participants to jointly train a model over their private inputs by
employing techniques like homomorphic encryption [Gen09, GLN12, LLH+17] or secure multi-party
computation (MPC) [Yao82, Bei11, MZ17, DGL+19]. Recent work proposed to use cryptographic
methods to secure federated learning by designing a secure gradients aggregation protocol [BIK+16]
or encrypting gradients [AHWM17]. These approaches slow down the computation by orders of
magnitude, and may also require special security environment setups.
Instance Hiding. See Appendix A.
9 Discussions of Potential Attacks
We have received proposals of attacks since the release of early versions of this manuscript. We
would like to thank these comments, which helped enhance the security of InstaHide. We hereby
summarize some of them and explain why InstaHide in its current design is not vulnerable to them.
6https://github.com/Hazelsuko07/InstaHide Challenge.
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Trame`r’s attack. Florian Trame`r [Tra20] suggested an attack pipeline which 1) firstly uses
GANs to undo the random one-time sign flips of encrypted images, and 2) then runs standard
image-similarity search between the recovered image and images in the public dataset.
We have evaluated this attack scenario in Section 5.3 (see ‘Demask using GAN’ for the first
step, and ‘Uncover public images by similarity search’ for the second step). As shown, the GAN
demasking step corrects about 1/4 of the flipped signs (see Figure 6), however this doesn’t appear
enough to allow further attacks (see Figure 8).
Several designs of InstaHide could provide better practice of privacy under this attack: 1) setting
a conservative upper threshold for the coefficients in mixing (e.g. 0.65 in our experiments) makes
it harder to train the demasking GAN. 2) To alleviate the threat of image-similarity search for
public image retrieval, we use randomly cropped patches from public images. This could enlarge
the search space of pubic images by some large constant factor. We also suggest using a very large
public dataset (e.g. ImageNet) if possible.
Braverman’s attack. Mark Braverman [Bra20] proposed another possible attack to retrieve
public images got mixed in an InstaHide image. Given x˜ ∈ Rd, the InstaHide image and the public
dataset D ⊂ Rd, the attacker calculates for each s ∈ D the value vs = 〈x˜2, s2〉 − 1d‖x˜‖22‖s‖22, and
ranks them in descending order. Braverman suggested that in theory, if images are drawn from
Gaussian distributions, the public images got mixed will have higher ranks (i.e., there is a gap
between vs’s for s’s got mixed in x˜ and vs’s for s’s not got mixed in x˜). With that, the attacker
may be able to shrink the candidate search space for public images by a large factor. A brief
accompanying paper with theory and experiments for this attack is forthcoming.
Braverman’s attack can be seen as similar in spirit to the attack on vanilla Mixup in Section 2.2,
with the difference that it needs images to behave like Gaussian vectors for higher moments, and
not just inner products. In the empirical study, we find 1) the gaussianity assumption is not so
good for real images 2) the shrinkage of candidate search space by Braverman’s attack is small for
k = 4 and almost disappears for k = 6.
To alleviate the risk of Bravermen’s attack, we reemphasize our suggestions in Section 6: 1) use
a large public dataset and use random cropping as the preprocessing step. This will increase the
original search space of public images; 2) use a larger k (e.g. 6) if possible (3) maybe use a high
quality GAN instead of the public dataset for mixing.
10 Conclusion
InstaHide is a practical instance-hiding method for image data for private distributed deep learning.
InstaHide uses the Mixup method with a one-time secret key consisting of a pixel-wise random
sign-flipping mask and samples from the same training dataset (Inside-dataset InstaHide) or a
large public dataset (Cross-dataset InstaHide). The proposed method can be easily plugged into
any existing distributed learning pipeline. It is very efficient and incurs minor reduction in accuracy.
Maybe modifications of this idea can further alleviate the loss in accuracy that we observe, especially
as k increases.
We hope our analysis of InstaHide’s security on worst-case vectors will motivate further theo-
retical study, including for average-case settings and for adversarial robustness. In Appendix D, we
suggest that although InstaHide can be formulated as a phase retrieval problem, classical techniques
have failed as attacks.
We have tried statistical and computational attacks against InstaHide without success. To
encourage other researchers to try new attacks, we release a challenge dataset of encrypted images.
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Appendix
The appendix is organized as follows: Appendix A reviews Instance hiding. Appendix B provides
more details for two attacks on Mixup schemes in Section 2. Appendix C discusses k-SUM, a
well-known fine-grained complexity problem that is related to the worst-case security argument
of InstaHide. Appendix D shows the connection between InstaHide and phase retrieval. Finally,
Appendix E provides experimental details.
A Instance Hiding
In the classical setting of instance hiding [AFK87] in cryptography, a computationally-limited Alice
is trying to get more powerful computing services Bob1 and Bob2 to help her compute a function
f on input x, without revealing x. The simplest case is that f is a linear function over a finite
field (e.g., integers modulo a prime number). Then Alice can pick a random number r and “hide”
the input x by asking Bob1 for f(x + r) and Bob2 for f(r), and then infer f(x) from the two
answers. When all arithmetic is done modulo a prime, it can be shown that neither Bob1 nor Bob2
individually learns anything (information-theoretically speaking) about x. This scheme can also be
applied to compute polynomials instead of linear functions.
InstaHide is inspired by the special case where there is a single computational agent Bob1. Alice
has to use random values r such that she knows f(r), and simply ask Bob1 to supply f(x + r).
Note that such a random value r would be use-once (also called nonce in cryptography); it would
not be reused when trying to evaluate a different input.
B Attacks on Mixup
Here we provide more details for the attacks discussed in Section 2.
Notations. We use 〈u, v〉 to denote the inner product between vector u and v. We use 0 to
denote the zero vector. For a vector x, we use ‖x‖2 to denote its `2 norm. For a positive integer n,
we use [n] to denote set {1, 2, · · · , n}. We use Pr[] to denote the probability, use E[] to denote the
expectation. We use N (µ, σ2) to denote Gaussian distribution. For any two vectors x, y, we use
〈x, y〉 to denote the inner product.
B.1 Don’t mix up the same image multiple times
Let us continue with the vision task. This attack argues that given a pair of Mixup images x˜1 and
x˜2, by simply checking 〈x˜1, x˜2〉, the attacker can determine with high probability whether x˜1 and
x˜2 are derived from the same image. We show this by a simple case with k = 2 in Theorem B.1,
where k is the number of images used to generate a Mixup sample.
Theorem B.1. Let X ⊂ Rd with |X | = n and ∀x ∈ X , we sample x ∼ N (0, σ2I) where σ2 = 1/d.
Let X1, X2 and X3 denote three disjoint sets such that X1 ∪X2 ∪X3 = X , with probability 1− δ, we
have:
Part 1. For x1 ∈ X1, x2, x′2 ∈ X2, x3 ∈ X3, 〈x3 + x1, x2 + x′2〉 ≤ c1 · 4σ2
√
d log2(dn/δ).
Part 2. For x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2, x3 ∈ X3, 〈x3 + x1, x3 + x2〉 ≥ (c2 ·
√
log(n/δ) + d)σ2 − c1 ·
3σ2
√
d log2(dn/δ). where c1, c2 > 0 are two universal constants.
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Proof. Part 1. First, we can expand 〈x3 + x1, x2 + x′2〉,
〈x3 + x1, x2 + x′2〉 = 〈x3, x2〉+ 〈x1, x2〉+ 〈x3, x′2〉+ 〈x1, x′2〉
For each fixed u ∈ {x3, x1} and each fixed v ∈ {x2, x′2}, using Lemma B.8, we have
Pr
[
|〈u, v〉| ≥ c1 · σ2
√
d log2(dn/δ)
]
≤ δ/n2.
where c1 > 1 is some sufficiently large constant.
Since x1, x2, x2, x3 are independent random Gaussian vectors, taking a union bound over all
pairs of u and v, we have Lemma B.8, we have
Pr[|〈x3 + x1, x2 + x′2〉| ≥ c1 · 4σ2
√
d log2(dn/δ)
]
≤ 4δ/n2. (1)
Part 2.
We can lower bound |〈x3 + x1, x3 + x2〉| in the following sense,
|〈x3 + x1, x3 + x2〉| = |〈x3, x3〉+ 〈x3, x2〉+ 〈x1, x3〉+ 〈x1, x2〉|
≥ |〈x3, x3〉| − |〈x3, x2〉+ 〈x1, x3〉+ 〈x1, x2〉|
For a fixed x3, we can lower bound ‖x3‖22 with Lemma B.5,
Pr
[
‖x3‖22 > (c2 ·
√
log(n/δ) + d)σ2
]
≥ 1− δ/n2.
Since x1, x2, x3 are independent random Gaussian vectors, using Lemma B.8, we have
Pr[|〈x3, x2〉+ 〈x1, x3〉+ 〈x1, x2〉| ≥ c1 · 3σ2
√
d log2(dn/δ)
]
≤ 3δ/n2. (2)
where c1 > 1 is some sufficiently large constant.
Thus, for a fixed x3, we have
|〈x3 + x1, x3 + x2〉| ≥ (c2 ·
√
log(n/δ) + d)σ2 − c1 · 3σ2
√
d log2(dn/δ)
holds with probability 1− δ/n2 − 3δ/n2 = 1− 4δ/n2.
Corollary B.2. Let X ⊂ Rd with |X | = n and ∀x ∈ X , we sample x ∼ N (0, σ2I) where σ2 = 1/d.
Let X1, X2 and X3 denote three disjoint sets such that X1 ∪ X2 ∪ X3 = X .
For any β > 1, if (2β)−1 · √d log2(nd/δ) ≥ 4, then with probability 1− δ , we have :
for x1 ∈ X1, x2, x′2 ∈ X2, x3 ∈ X3,
|〈x3 + x1, x3 + x2〉| ≥ β · |〈x3 + x1, x2 + x′2〉|.
Proof. With Theorem B.1, we have with probability 1− δ, we have :
|〈x3 + x1, x3 + x2〉|
|〈x3 + x1, x2 + x′2〉|
≥ (c2 ·
√
log(n/δ) + d)σ2 − c1 · 3σ2
√
d log2(dn/δ)
c1 · 4σ2
√
d log2(nd/δ)
=
c2 ·
√
log(n/δ) + d− c1 · 3
√
d log2(nd/δ)
c1 · 4
√
d log2(nd/δ)
=
1 + c2/(c1 · d) ·
√
log(n/δ)− 3/√d · log2(nd/δ)
4/
√
d · log2(nd/δ)
≥ 1− 3/
√
d · log2(nd/δ)
4/
√
d · log2(nd/δ) ≥
1− 1/(2β)
1/(2β)
= 2β − 1 ≥ β,
where the forth step follows from choice c1 and c2, the fifth step follows from assumption in Lemma
statement, and the last step follows from β > 1.
Thus, we complete the proof.
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B.2 Attacks that run in |X | time
This attack says that, if a cross-dataset Mixup sample x˜ is generated by mixing 1 sample from a
privacy-sensitive original dataset and k−1 samples from a public dataset (say ImageNet [DDS+09]),
then the attacker can crack the k− 1 samples from the public dataset by simply checking the inner
product between x˜ and all images in the public dataset. We show this formally in Theorem B.3.
Theorem B.3. Let X ⊂ Rd with |X | = n and ∀x ∈ X , we sample x ∼ N (0, σ2I). Let x˜ = ∑ki=1 xi,
where xi ∈ X , with probability 1− δ, we have:
Part 1. For all t′ ∈ [n]\[k], 〈x˜, xt′〉 ≤ c1 · kσ2
√
d log2(nd/δ).
Part 2. For all t ∈ [k], 〈x˜, xt〉 ≥ (c2 ·
√
log(n/δ) + d)σ2 − c1 · (k − 1)σ2
√
d log2(nd/δ).
where c1, c2 > 0 are two universal constants.
We remark that the proof of Theorem B.3 is similar to the proof of Theorem B.1.
Proof. Part 1. We can rewrite 〈x˜, xt′〉 as follows:
〈x˜, xt′〉 =
k∑
i=1
〈xi, xt′〉,
which implies
|〈x˜, xt′〉| ≤
k∑
i=1
|〈xi, xt′〉|.
For each fixed i ∈ [k] and each fixed t′ /∈ [k], using Lemma B.8, we have
Pr
[
|〈xi, xt′〉| ≥ c1 · σ2
√
d log2(dn/δ)
]
≤ δ/n2.
where c1 > 1 is some sufficiently large constant.
Since x1, x2, · · · , xk, xt′ are independent random Gaussian vectors, taking a union over all i ∈ [k],
we have
Pr
[
|〈x˜, xt′〉| ≥ c1 · kσ2
√
d log2(dn/δ)
]
≤ δk/n2.
Taking a union bound over all t′ ∈ [n]\[k], we have
Pr
[
∀t′ ∈ [n]\[k], |〈x˜, xt′〉| ≥ c1 · kσ2
√
d log2(dn/δ)
]
≤ δ(n− k)k/n2.
Part 2.
We can lower bound |〈x˜, xt〉| as follows:
|〈x˜, xt〉| =
∣∣∣〈xt, xt〉+ ∑
i∈[k]\{t}
〈xi, xt〉
∣∣∣ ≥ |〈xt, xt〉| − ∣∣∣ ∑
i∈[k]\{t}
〈xi, xt〉
∣∣∣
≥ |〈xt, xt〉| −
∑
i∈[k]\{t}
|〈xi, xt〉|.
First, we can bound ‖xt‖22 with Lemma B.5,
Pr
[
‖xt‖22 > (c2 ·
√
log(n/δ) + d)σ2
]
≥ 1− δ/n2.
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For each i ∈ [k]\{t}, using Lemma B.8, we have
Pr
[
|〈xi, xt〉| ≥ c1 · σ2
√
d log2(dn/δ)
]
≤ δ/n2.
where c1 > 1 is some sufficiently large constant.
Taking a union bound over all i ∈ [k]\{t}, we have
Pr
[ ∑
i∈[k]\{t}
|〈xi, xt〉| ≥ c1 · (k − 1)σ2
√
d log2(dn/δ)
]
≤ δ(k − 1)/n2.
Thus, for a fixed t ∈ [k], we have
|〈x˜, xt〉| ≥ (c2 ·
√
log(n/δ) + d)σ2 − c1 · (k − 1)σ2
√
d log2(dn/δ)
holds with probability 1− δ/n2 − δ(k − 1)/n2 = 1− δk/n2.
Taking a union bound over all t ∈ [k], we complete the proof.
Corollary B.4. Let X ⊂ Rd with |X | = n and ∀x ∈ X , we sample x ∼ N (0, σ2I). Let x˜ = ∑ki=1 xi,
where xi ∈ X .
For any β > 1, if k ≤ (2β)−1 · √d log2(nd/δ), then with probability 1− δ , we have :
for all t′ ∈ [n]\[k] and all t ∈ [k]
|〈x˜, xt〉| ≥ β · |〈x˜, xt′〉|.
Proof. With Theorem B.3, we have with probability 1− δ, we have : for all t ∈ [k] and t′ /∈ [k],
|〈x˜, xt〉|
|〈x˜, xt′〉| ≥
(c2 ·
√
log(n/δ) + d)σ2 − c1 · (k − 1)σ2
√
d log2(nd/δ)
c1 · kσ2
√
d log2(nd/δ)
=
c2 ·
√
log(n/δ) + d− c1 · (k − 1)
√
d log2(nd/δ)
c1 · k
√
d log2(nd/δ)
=
1 + c2/(c1 · d) ·
√
log(n/δ)− (k − 1)/√d · log2(nd/δ)
k/
√
d · log2(nd/δ)
≥ 1− k/
√
d · log2(nd/δ)
k/
√
d · log2(nd/δ) ≥
1− 1/(2β)
1/(2β)
= 2β − 1 ≥ β,
where the forth step follows from the choice of c1 and c2, the fifth step follows from the assumption
in the Lemma statement, and the last step follows from β > 1.
Thus, we complete the proof.
B.3 Chi-square concentration and Bernstein inequality
We state two well-known probability tools in this section.7 One is the concentration inequality for
Chi-square and the other is Bernstein inequality.
First, we state a concentration inequality for Chi-square:
7The major of idea of the provable results in this section is p-th moment concentration inequality (see Lemma 3.1
in [CLS20] as an example). The inner product “attack” for Mixup is based on p = 2. The inner product “attack” for
InstaHide is based on p = 4 (suggested by [Bra20]).
26
Lemma B.5 (Lemma 1 on page 1325 of Laurent and Massart [LM00]). Let X ∼ X 2k be a chi-
squared distributed random variable with k degrees of freedom. Each one has zero mean and σ2
variance. Then
Pr[X − kσ2 ≥ (2
√
kt+ 2t)σ2] ≤ exp(−t), and Pr[kσ2 −X ≥ 2
√
ktσ2] ≤ exp(−t).
We state the Bernstein inequality as follows:
Lemma B.6 (Bernstein inequality [Ber24]). Let X1, · · · , Xn be independent zero-mean random
variables. Suppose that |Xi| ≤M almost surely, for all i ∈ [n]. Then, for all t > 0,
Pr
[
n∑
i=1
Xi > t
]
≤ exp
(
− t
2/2∑n
j=1 E[X2j ] +Mt/3
)
.
B.4 Inner product between a random Gaussian vector a fixed vector
The goal of this section is to prove Lemma B.7. It provides a high probability bound for the
absolute value of inner product between one random Gaussian vector with a fixed vector.
Lemma B.7 (Inner product between a random Gaussian vector and a fixed vector). Let u1, · · · , ud
denote i.i.d. random Gaussian variables where ui ∼ N (0, σ21).
Then, for any fixed vector e ∈ Rd, for any failure probability δ ∈ (0, 1/10), we have
Pr
u
[
|〈u, e〉| ≥ 2σ1‖e‖2
√
log(d/δ) + σ1‖e‖∞ log1.5(d/δ)
]
≤ δ.
Proof. First, we can compute E[ui] and E[u2i ]
E[ui] = 0, and E[u2i ] = σ21.
Next, we can upper bound |ui| and |uiei|.
Pr
u
[|ui − E[ui]| ≥ t1] ≤ exp(−t21/(2σ21)).
Take t1 =
√
2 log(d/δ)σ1, then for each fixed i ∈ [d], we have, |ui| ≤
√
2 log(d/δ)σ1 holds with
probability 1− δ/d.
Taking a union bound over d coordinates, with probability 1 − δ, we have : for all i ∈ [d],
|ui| ≤
√
2 log(d/δ)σ1.
Let E1 denote the event that, maxi∈[d] |uiei| is upper bounded by
√
2 log(d/δ)σ1‖e‖∞. Pr[E1] ≥
1− δ.
Using Bernstein inequality (Lemma B.6), we have
Pr
u
[|〈u, e〉| ≥ t] ≤ exp
(
− t
2/2
‖e‖22 E[u2i ] + maxi∈[d] |uiei| · t/3
)
≤ exp
(
− t
2/2
‖e‖22σ21 +
√
2 log(d/δ)σ1‖e‖∞ · t/3
)
≤ δ,
where the second step follows from Pr[E1] ≥ 1 − δ and E[u2i ] = σ21, and the last step follows from
choice of t:
t = 2σ1‖e‖2
√
log(d/δ) + σ1‖e‖∞ log1.5(d/δ)
Taking a union bound with event E1, we have Pr[|〈u, e〉| ≥ t] ≤ 2δ. Finally, rescaling δ finishes
the proof.
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B.5 Inner product between two random Gaussian vectors
The goal of this section is to prove Lemma B.8. It provides a high probability bound for the
absolute value of inner product between two random (independent) Gaussian vectors.
Lemma B.8 (Inner product between two random Gaussian vectors). Let u1, · · · , ud denote i.i.d.
random Gaussian variables where ui ∼ N (0, σ21) and e1, · · · , ed denote i.i.d. random Gaussian
variables where ei ∼ N (0, σ22).
Then, for any failure probability δ ∈ (0, 1/10), we have
Pr
u,e
[
|〈u, e〉| ≥ 104σ1σ2
√
d log2(d/δ)
]
≤ δ.
Proof. First, using Lemma B.5, we compute the upper bound for ‖e‖22
Pr
e
[‖e‖22 − dσ22 ≥ (2
√
dt+ 2t)σ22] ≤ exp(−t).
Take t = log(1/δ), then with probability 1− δ,
‖e‖22 ≤ (d+ 3
√
d log(1/δ) + 2 log(1/δ))σ22 ≤ 4d log(1/δ)σ22.
Thus
Pr
e
[‖e‖2 ≤ 4
√
d log(1/δ)σ2] ≥ 1− δ.
Second, we compute the upper bound for ‖e‖∞ (the proof is similar to Lemma B.7)
Pr
e
[|‖e‖∞ ≤
√
log(d/δ)σ2] ≥ 1− δ.
We define t and t′ as follows
t = 4 · (σ1‖e‖2
√
log(d/δ) + σ1‖e‖∞ log1.5(d/δ)), and t′ = 8 · (σ1σ2
√
d log(d/δ) + σ1σ2 log
2(d/δ))
From the above calculations, we can show
Pr
e
[t′ ≥ t] ≥ 1− 2δ.
By Lemma B.7, for fixed e, we have
Pr
u
[|〈u, e〉| ≥ t] ≤ δ
Overall, we have
Pr
e,u
[|〈u, e〉| ≥ t′] ≤ 3δ
Therefore, rescaling δ completes the proof.
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C Computational hardness results of d-dimensional k-SUM
The basic components in InstaHide schemes are inspired by computationally hard problems derived
from the classic SUBSET-SUM problem: given a set of integers, decide if there is a non-empty subset
of integers whose integers sum to 0. It is a version of knapsack, one of the Karp’s 21 NP-complete
problems [Kar72]. The k-SUM [Eri95] is the parametrized version of the SUBSET-SUM. Given a
set of integers, one wants to ask if there is a subset of k integers sum to 0. The k-SUM problem
can be solved in O(ndk/2e) time. For any integer k ≥ 3 and constant  > 0, whether k-SUM can be
solved in O(nbk/2c−) time has been a long-standing open problem. Patrascu [Pat10], Abboud and
Lewi [AL13] conjectured that such algorithm doesn’t exist.
It is natural to extend definition from one-dimensional scalar/number case to the high-dimensional
vector case. For d-dimensional k-sum over finite field, Bhattacharyya, Indyk, Woodruff and Xie
[BIWX11] have shown that any algorithm that solves this problem has to take min{2Ω(d), nΩ(k)}
time unless Exponential Time Hypothesis is false. Here, Exponential Time Hypothesis is believed
to be true, it states that there is no 2o(n) time to solve 3SAT with n variables.
In this work, we observe that privacy of InstaHide can be interpreted as d-dimensional k-SUM
problem and thus could be intractable and safe. For real field, d-dimensional is equivalent to 1-
dimensional due to [ALW14]. Therefore, Patrascu [Pat10], Abboud and Lewi [AL13]’s conjecture
also suitable for d-dimensional k-SUM problem, and several hardness results in d = 1 also can be
applied to general d > 1 directly.
C.1 k-SUM
We hereby provide a detailed explanation for the d-dimensional k-SUM problem. Let us start with
the special case of d = 1 and all values are integers.
Definition C.1 (SUBSET-SUM). Given a set of integers, if there is a subset of integers whose
integers sum to 0.
SUBSET-SUM is a well-known NP-complete problem.
The k-SUM is the parameterized version of the SUBSET-SUM,
Definition C.2 (k-SUM). Given a set of integers, if there is a subset of k integers whose integers
sum to 0.
The k-SUM problem can be solved in O(ndk/2e) time. For k = 3, Baran, Demaine and Patrascu
[BDP08] introduced algorithm that takes O(n2/ log2 n) time. It has been a longstanding open
problem to solve k-SUM for some k in time O(ndk/2e−). Therefore, complexity communities made
the following conjecture,
Conjecture C.3 (The k-SUM Conjecture, [AL13]). There does not exist a k ≥ 2, an  > 0, and a
randomized algorithm that succeeds (with high probability) in solving k-SUM in time O(ndk/2e−).
Although the nd(k/2)e hardness for k-SUM is not based on anything else at the moment, an nΩ(k)
lower bound under ETH is already known due to Abboud and Lewi [AL13]. Recently, Abboud
[Abb19] also shows a weaker nΩ(k/ log k) lower bound under the Set Cover Conjecture, but it has
the advantage that it holds for any fixed k > 2.
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C.2 k Vector Sum over Finite Field
Now we move onto the d-dimensional k vector sum problem.
Definition C.4 (d-dimensional k-VEC-SUM over finite field). Given a set of n vectors in Fdq , if
there is a subset of k vectors such that the summation of those k vectors is an all 0 vector.
A more general definition that fits the InstaHide setting is called k-VEC-T-SUM (where T
denotes the “target”),
Definition C.5 (d-dimensional k-VEC-T-SUM over finite field). Given a set of n vectors in Fdq , if
there is a subset of k vectors such that the summation of those k vectors is equal to some vector z
in Fdq .
d-dimensional k-VEC-T-SUM and d-dimensional k-VEC-SUM are considered to have the same
hardness. Bhattacharyya, Indyk, Woodruff and Xie [BIWX11] proved hardness result for the
problem defined in Definition C.4 and Definition C.5. Before stating the hardness result, we need
to define several basic concepts in complexity. We introduce the definition of 3SAT and Exponential
Time Hypothesis(ETH). For the details and background of 3SAT problem, we refer the readers to
[AB09].
Definition C.6 (3SAT problem). Given n variables and m clauses conjunctive normal form CNF
formula with size of each clause at most 3, the goal is to decide whether there exits an assignment
for the n boolean variables to make the CNF formula be satisfied.
We state the definition of Exponential Time Hypotheis, which can be thought of as a stronger
assumption than P6=NP.
Hypothesis C.7 (Exponential Time Hypothesis (ETH) [IPZ98]). There is a δ > 0 such that 3SAT
problem defined in Definition C.6 cannot be solved in O(2δn) running time.
Now, we are ready to state the hardness result.
Theorem C.8 ([BIWX11]). Assuming Exponential Time Hypothesis (ETH), any algorithm solves
k-VEC-SUM or k-T-VEC-SUM requires min{2Ω(d), nΩ(k)} time.
C.3 k Vector Sum over Bounded Integers
For the bounded integer case, we can also define the k-VEC-SUM problem,
Definition C.9 (d-dimensional k-VEC-SUM over bounded integers). For integers k, n, M , d > 0,
the k-VEC-SUM problem is to determine, given vectors x1, · · · , xn, x ∈ [0, kM ]d, if there is a size-k
subset S ⊆ [n] such that ∑i∈S xi = z.
Abboud, Lewi, and Williams proved that the 1-dimensional k-VEC-SUM and d-dimensional
k-VEC-SUM are equivalent in bounded integer setting,
Lemma C.10 (Lemma 3.1 in [ALW14]). Let k, p, d, s,M ∈ N satisfy k < p, pd ≥ kM + 1, and
s = (k + 1)d−1. There is a collection of mappings f1, ·, fs : [0,M ] × [0, kM ] → [−kp, kp]d, each
computable in time O(poly logM + kd), such that for all numbers x1, · · · , xk ∈ [0,M ] and targets
t ∈ [0, kM ],
k∑
j=1
xj = t ⇐⇒ ∃i ∈ [s]
k∑
j=1
fi(xj , t).
Due to the above result, as long as we know a hardness result for classical k-SUM, then it
automatically implies a hardness result for d-dimensional k-VEC-SUM.
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D Phase Retrieval
D.1 Compressive Sensing
Compressive sensing is a powerful mathematical framework the goal of which is to reconstruct an
approximately k-sparse vector x ∈ Rn from linear measurements y = Φx, where Φ ∈ Rm×n is called
“sensing” or “sketching” matrix. The mathematical framework was initiated by [CRT06, Don06].
We provide the definition of the `2/`2 compressive sensing problem.
Definition D.1 (Problem 1.1 in [NS19]). Given parameters , k, n, and a vector x ∈ Rn. The goal
is to design some matrix Φ ∈ Rm×n and a recovery algorithm A such that we can output a vector
x′ based on measurements y = Φx,
‖x′ − x‖2 ≤ (1 + ) min
k−sparse z∈Rn
‖z − x‖2.
We primarily want to minimize m (which is the number of measurements), the running time of
A(which is the decoding time) and column sparsity of Φ.
The `2/`2 is the most popular framework, and the state-of-the-art result is due to [GLPS10,
NS19].
D.2 Phase Retrieval
In compressive sensing, we can observe y = Φx. However, in phase retrieval, we can only observe
y = |Φx|. Here, we provide the definition of `2/`2 phase retrieval problem.
Definition D.2 ([LN18]). Given parameters , k, n, and a vector x ∈ Rn. The goal is to design
some matrix Φ ∈ Rm×n and a recovery algorithm A such that we can output a vector x′ based on
measurements y = |Φx|,
‖x′ − x‖2 ≤ (1 + ) min
k−sparse z∈Rn
‖z − x‖2.
We primarily want to minimize m (which is the number of measurements), the running time of A
(which is the decoding time) and column sparsity of Φ.
The state-of-the-art result is due to [LN18].
The problem formulation of compressive sensing and phase retrieval have many variations, for
more details we refer the readers to several surveys [Pri13, Has16, Nak19, Son19].
D.3 Comments on Phase Retrieval
We would like to point out that although InstaHide can be formulated as a phase retrieval problem,
classical techniques will fail as an attack.
To show the phase retrieval formulation of InstaHide, we first argue applying the random pixel-
wise sign is equivalent to taking the absolute value, namely (A): x = σ ◦ fmix(x) is equivalent to
(B): x = |fmix(x)|, where fmix(·) denote the mixing function. This is because, to reduce from B
to A, we can just take absolute value in each coordinate; and to reduce from A to B, we can just
select a random mask (i.e., σ) and apply it.
Classical phase retrieval [Fie78, Fie82, MRB07] aims to recover x given y = |Φx|, where Φ ∈
Rm×n, x ∈ Rn and y ∈ Rm. In the InstaHide setting, one can think of Φ as the concatenation
of the private and public dataset, where n = nprivate + npublic, and x is a k-sparse vector which
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selects k out of n data points to Mixup. Therefore, y = |Φx| is the ‘encrypted’ sample using
InstaHide. It has been shown that solving x can be formulated as a linear program [MRB07]. It
is well-known that linear program can be solved in polynomial in number of constraints/variables
[CLS19, JSWZ20] and thus m = O(k2 log(n/k2)) gives a polynomial-time optimization procedure.
However, this result does not naturally serve as an attack on InstaHide. First, Φ in phase retrieval
needs to satisfy certain properties which may not be true for Φ in InstaHide. More importantly,
running LP becomes impossible for InstaHide case, since part of Φ remains unknown.
E Experiments
E.1 Network architecture and hyperparameters
Table 3 provides Implementation details of the deep models. All experiments are conducted on 24
NVIDIA RTX 2080 Ti GPUs.
MNIST CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100
[LCB10] [Kri09] [Kri09]
Input normalization parameters
(normalized = (input-mean)/std)
mean: (0.50, 0.50, 0.50)
std: (0.50, 0.50, 0.50)
mean: (0.49, 0.48, 0.45)
std: (0.20, 0.20, 0.20)
mean: (0.49, 0.48, 0.45)
std: (0.20, 0.20, 0.20)
Number of Epochs 30 200 200
Network architecture ResNet-18 ResNet-18 NasNet
[HZRS16] [HZRS16] [ZVSL18]
Optimizer SGD (momentum = 0.9) [Qia99]
Initial learning rate (vanilla
training)
0.1 0.1 0.1
Initial learning rate (InstaHide) 0.1 0.1 0.1
Learning rate decay by a factor of 0.1 at the
15th epoch
by a factor of 0.1 at 100th
and 150th epochs
by a factor of 0.2 at
60th, 120th and 160th
epochs
Regularization `2-regularization (10
−4)
Batch size 128
Table 3: Implementation details of network architectures and training schemes.
E.2 Details of attacks
We hereby provide more details for the attacks in Section 5.3.
Gradients matching attack. Algorithm 3 describes the gradients matching attack [ZLH19].
This attack aims to recover the original image from model gradients computed on it. In the
InstaHide setting, the goal becomes to recover x˜, the image after InstaHside. As we have shown
in Section 4, the upper bound on the privacy loss in gradients matching attack is the loss when
attacker is given x˜.
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Algorithm 3 Gradients matching attack
1: Require :
2: The function F (x;W ) can be thought of as a neural network, for each l ∈ [L], we define
Wl ∈ Rml×ml−1 to be the weight matrix in l-th layer, and m0 = di and ml = do. W =
{W1,W2, · · · ,WL} denotes the weights over all layers.
3: Let (x0, y0) denote a private (image, label) pair.
4: Let L : Rdo×do → R denote loss function
5: Let g(x, y) = ∇L(F (x;W ), y) denote the gradients of loss function, and ĝ = g(x, y)|x=x0,y=y0 is
the gradients computed on x0 with label y0
6: procedure InputRecoveryfromGradients()
7: x(1) ← N (0, 1), y(1) ← N (0, 1) . Random initialization of the input and the label
8: for t = 1→ T do
9: Let Dg(x, y) = ‖g(x, y)− ĝ‖22
10: x(t+1) ← x(t) − η · ∇xDg(x, y)|x=x(t)
11: y(t+1) ← y(t) − η · ∇yDg(x, y)|y=y(t)
12: end for
13: return x(T+1), y(T+1)
14: end procedure
E.3 Results of the Kolmogorov–Smirnov Test
In order to further understand whether there is significant difference among distributions of In-
staHide encryptions of different x’, we run the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test [Kol33, Smi48].
Specifically, we randomly pick 10 different private xi’s, i ∈ [10], and generate 400 encryptions
for each xi (4,000 in total). We sample x˜ij , j ∈ [400], the encryption of a given xi, and run KS-test
under two different settings:
• x˜ij v.s. all encryptions (All): KS-test(statistics of x˜ij , statistics of all x˜uj ’s for u ∈ [10])
• x˜ij v.s. encryptions of other xu’s, u 6= i (Other): KS-test(statistics of x˜ij , statistics of all
x˜uj ’s for u ∈ [10], u 6= i)
For each xi, we run the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test for 50 independent x˜ij ’s, and report the
averaged p-value as below (a higher p-value indicates a higher probability that x˜ij comes from the
tested distribution). We test 7 different statistics: pixel-wise mean, pixel-wise standard deviation,
total variation, and the pixel values of 4 random locations. KS-test results suggest that, there is
no significant differences among distribution of encryptions of different images.
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Pixel-wise Mean Pixel-wise Std Total Variation Location 1 Location 2 Location 3 Location 4
All Other All Other All Other All Other All Other All Other All Other
x1 0.49 0.49 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.61 0.61 0.58 0.58 0.61 0.61 0.59 0.59
x2 0.53 0.52 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.65 0.65 0.56 0.56 0.61 0.61 0.74 0.74
x3 0.54 0.53 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.61 0.61 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.58 0.58
x4 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.40 0.41 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
x5 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.60 0.60 0.72 0.72 0.66 0.66 0.50 0.50
x6 0.44 0.43 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.66 0.66 0.69 0.69 0.52 0.52 0.60 0.59
x7 0.45 0.45 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.62 0.62 0.52 0.52 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.66
x8 0.46 0.46 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.75 0.76 0.69 0.69 0.63 0.63 0.73 0.73
x9 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.60 0.60 0.67 0.67 0.54 0.54 0.59 0.59
x10 0.44 0.44 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.66 0.67 0.65 0.65 0.67 0.67 0.65 0.65
Table 4: Averaged p-values for running KS-test on 50 encryptions for each xi, i ∈ [10]. For each
row, ‘All’ and ‘Other’ tests give similar p-values, suggesting there is no significant differences among
distribution of encryptions of different images.
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